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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re the Marriage of VICTOR and ANA LOCKLIN.

VICTOR L. LOCKLIN,

Respondent,

v.

ANA LUISA LOCKLIN,

Appellant.

E048675

(Super.Ct.No. RID202503)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Matthew C. Perantoni,

Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

Ana Luisa Locklin, in pro. per., for Appellant.

The Law Offices of Milo F. DeArmey, Milo F. DeArmey and Matthew S.

DeArmey for Respondent.

I

INTRODUCTION

Ana Luisa Locklin (Ana), respondent and appellant, appeals a judgment of

dissolution and reserved issues entered on April 24, 2009, and from the denial of a premature motion to vacate a judgment. Ana is representing herself in propria persona. Victor L. Locklin (Victor), petitioner and respondent on appeal, is represented by counsel. To the extent we can understand Ana's contentions, we affirm the judgment.

II

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The parties were married in September 1986 and Victor filed a petition for marital dissolution in September 2003. They have four children born in 1987, 1990, 1995, and 1996. As of July 2008, only two children were minors. Ana is a licensed real estate broker who owned Action 1 Realty. Victor is a deputy sheriff for Los Angeles County.

After a trial conducted intermittently between May 2007 and March 2008, the parties both filed proposed statements of decision in April 2008. In Ana's proposed statement of decision, she sought to obtain a child support order (for three children) of \$2,713 a month and a spousal support order of \$2,209 per month.

In May 2008, the court conducted a hearing about the proposed statements of decision and took the matter under submission. In June 2008, the court issued its own written ruling, ordering counsel for Victor to prepare the final judgment. The court found that Ana had intentionally closed her real estate business in September 2006 to reduce her income and assets. On the date of separation in 2003, the value of her business was \$267,000, which the court awarded as her sole and separate property. The court awarded Victor his retirement accounts valued at \$259,480. The court did not award spousal

support. The court awarded child support to Ana of \$724 a month for the two minors, beginning July 1, 2008.

Victor's counsel made several attempts to submit a proposed judgment, which the court rejected for various technical reasons. In August 2008, Ana filed a premature motion to vacate the proposed judgment before it was entered by the court. On September 26, 2008, the register of actions reports the proposed judgment was rejected "because the court's ruling of 6/27/08 does not order an equalization payment." The court denied Ana's motion to vacate on October 7, 2008. At the hearing, the parties also discussed the form of the judgment.

The judgment on reserved issues, prepared by Victor's counsel, was finally filed on April 24, 2009. The judgment incorporates the same orders as stated in the court's ruling of June 2008 but it includes an equalization payment from Ana to Victor of \$3,760.

A second motion to vacate the judgment, filed in May 2009, is stayed but still pending in the lower court.

Ш

ANALYSIS

As a general rule, we review support orders under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (*In re Marriage of Nelson* (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1559.) "We examine the challenged order for legal and factual support. 'As long as the court

¹ The motion to vacate is not part of the record on appeal.

exercised its discretion along legal lines, its decision will be affirmed on appeal if there is substantial evidence to support it.' (*In re Marriage of Duncan* (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 617, 625; see *In re Marriage of Geraci* (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1286.) 'To the extent that a trial court's exercise of discretion is based on the facts of the case, it will be upheld "as long as its determination is within the range of the evidence presented."' (*In re Marriage of Ackerman* [(2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 197].) [¶] Where a question of law is presented on undisputed facts, appellate review is de novo. [Citations.]" (*In re Marriage of Blazer* (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1443; *In re Marriage of Calcaterra & Badakhsh* (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 28, 34.) Ana's arguments are difficult to follow and are often not supported by pertinent legal authority or citations to the record but we attempt to address them in turn.

Ana's primary argument is the trial court erred on May 12, 2009, when it ordered the final judgment to be processed over Ana's objections that it was incorrect. But Ana does not explain how the court erred simply by refusing to adopt her proposed statement of decision as the basis for the judgment. The court obviously disagreed with Ana's characterization of the case.

Next she contends substantial evidence does not support the judgment because the court miscalculated the value of her business, ignored her medical problems, and incorrectly assessed her monthly income and Victor's monthly income. All of her arguments on these issues essentially disregard the court's express finding that Ana deliberately suppressed her income by closing her real estate business. The court based its findings in part on the court-appointed expert's valuation of her business at \$267,108

and also on substantial evidence concerning Ana's real income of \$154,000 annually for 2004, 2005, and 2006 and about \$5,000 monthly for subsequent years.

Ana's reliance on her 2006 Social Security statement does not demonstrate how the court purportedly overestimated her imputed income in view of its finding of fraud on her part. Ana also cites to a medical report for July 2006 and various Internal Revenue Service (IRS) forms² but does not adequately explain how they demonstrate court error. Her comments about workers' compensation based on her income and expense declaration dated March 18, 2008, are not understandable. Her references to financial records and valuations concerning Action 1 Realty do not accomplish the additional analytic step of illustrating court error.

Ana briefly asserts that the trial court's award of child support and the absence of an award for spousal support are wrong because Victor misrepresented his income. The court, however, found that Victor's monthly salary was \$8,200, almost the same as the \$8,188 claimed by Ana. The child support order was properly based on Victor's monthly income of \$8,200 and Ana's monthly income of \$5,000. Ana shows no abuse of discretion by this finding.

Finally, Ana also objects to the equalization payment of \$3,760 ordered in the final judgment. But it appears the court finally recognized the payment was mathematically correct in view of the disparity in the property division between \$267,000 and \$259,480.

 $^{^{2}\,}$ The IRS forms are form 1096 for 2003, form 1099-MISC for 2004, form 1099-MISC for 2005, and form 1096 for 2006.

IV

DISPOSITION

Substantial evidence supports the judgment and confirms there was no abuse of discretion. We affirm the judgment.

Costs are awarded to Respondent.

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	s/Richli	J.
We concur:		
s/McKinster Acting P. J.		
s/Miller		